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Abstract—The large quantities of alerts generated by intrusion
detection systems (IDS) make very difficult to distinguish on a
network real threats from noise. To help solving this problem,
we propose VEGAS, an alerts visualization and classification
tool that allows first line security operators to group alerts
visually based on their principal component analysis (PCA)
representation. VEGAS is included in a workflow in such a way
that once a set of similar alerts has been collected and diagnosed,
a filter is generated that redirects forthcoming similar alerts to
other security analysts that are specifically in charge of this set
of alerts, in effect reducing the flow of raw undiagnosed alerts.
Index Terms—Visualization, Intrusion Detection, CyberSecu-
rity, PCA, Workflow, Teamwork.
INTRODUCTION
Security operators are in charge of the crucial tasks of
monitoring networks, detecting anomalies and attacks as well
as correcting them or at least limiting their impact. IDS
(Intrusion Detection Systems) have been developed to help
reach these goals. While they have proven to be useful, they
are well-known to raise large quantities of alerts. Worse, some
of these alerts are redundant, while some can be false positives,
i.e. alerts that are not related to an effective attack, due to
erroneous detection rule or incorrect tuning of the IDS. More-
over, even though the detected event was indeed malicious the
target of this event could be in fact not vulnerable. According
to [13], more than 90% of alerts reported by IDS are not linked
to relevant security issues.
We strongly believe that an efficient way to handle the large
quantity of alerts is to make collaboration among security
operators easier by better organizing the workflow through
visualization [6], [12]. Following that goal, we developed
VEGAS, an intuitive visualization tool that allows grouping
similar alerts easily and dispatching these groups of alerts
among security operators for further analysis. Once a security
operator has identified a group of alerts, any forthcoming
alert that should belong to that group will be forwarded
automatically to the analyst in charge of the group for further
analysis. Therefore, VEGAS reduces the amount of alerts
received by the operator in charge of dispatching them and
make the flow of alerts more manageable.
Specifically, VEGAS proposes the following contributions:
• Visual exploration of alerts based on principal component
analysis (PCA). Our system uses this technique to con-
vert incoming alerts into two dimensions variables and
represent them on a scatterplot, making it easier for the
security operator to group similar attacks.
• Assisted generation of rules to dispatch alerts. Once a
group of similar alerts has been identified, the security
operator can easily interact with VEGAS to generate a
rule that describes alerts belonging to this group.
• Filtering of incoming alerts based on previous manipu-
lations. Alerts are dispatched according to the rules that
have been generated. Therefore, VEGAS only displays
new alerts (i.e., alerts that do not belong to an identified
group of alerts that has already been taken care of) and
alerts that belong to a group are automatically dispatched
in this group for further analysis or persistent storage.
This paper is organized as follows. First, Section I presents
an overview of our approach. Then, we show in Section II
the main interface, with details about principal component
analysis, user interactions and the generation of dispatching
rules. In Section III, we provide an illustrative use case.
Finally, we discuss related work in Section IV.
I. ORGANIZING COLLABORATION TO MANAGE THE FLOW
OF ALERTS
A. IDS alerts as a data source
VEGAS uses IDS-generated alerts as a data source. Without
loss of generality, the prototype we developed for VEGAS uses
Snort alerts as a data source since they are common in public
datasets such as [3] for instance. We underline the fact that
it would be easy to switch to another alert format made of a
constant number of well-defined field.
Several fields describe the packet that is identified as mali-
cious by Snort. In VEGAS, these fields are treated differently
given their meaning: the type of alerts, the source and desti-
nation IP, and the source and destination port are used in the
PCA computation and in representations. The priority and the
timestamp are only used in representations. The fields cited
here are those described as important in the dataset [3].
B. Actors
VEGAS supposes two types of actors. First, a front-line
security operator is in charge of receiving the raw alerts and
quickly dispatching them using the interface that we describe
in Section II. Second, the security analyst inspects in details
each group of alerts transmitted by the front-line security
operator. In classical contexts, a given front-line security
operator generally dispatches alerts to a few security analysts.978-1-5090-0223-8/16/$31.00 c© 2016 IEEE
C. Workflow
Alerts generated by the IDS are transmitted to a filter that
dispatches them. Originally, the filter only has the default rule
that sends all the alerts to the front-line security operator for
display. When the front-line security operator identifies a new
group of alerts, he performs a quick analysis of it, annotates it
and adds a new filtering rule to the filter to redirect these alerts
to a new bucket to be analyzed by a security analyst. From
this moment, the group of alerts that has been identified by the
front-line security operator disappears from his or her interface
and is sent directly to the bucket. Forthcoming alerts matched
by the rule will also be sent directly to the bucket and won’t
be displayed on the front-line security operator interface.
When a security analyst is available to analyze a bucket, he
receives all the alerts matched by the rule (i.e., alerts that were
in the group when it was created and alerts that arrived later
and were dispatched to this bucket). He performs the required
analysis and deploys relevant mitigation actions if necessary
(patching a service, modifying firewall rules, reinstalling a
device, modifying configuration, etc.). He can also modify the
filtering rule according to the results of the analysis or of the
performed mitigation actions.
II. VISUAL REPRESENTATION OF ALERTS
A. Computing PCA and displaying alerts
Visual correlation is effective if humans can detect patterns
in the visualization, and many dimensions make it difficult to
detect relevant patterns. Due to that fact, we needed to perform
dimension reduction to offer the operator a simple enough rep-
resentation to detect similar alerts. We think that alerts should
be displayed in only two dimensions, to be easily manipulated.
We chose the Principal Component Analysis (PCA) [8] that
as been proven efficient for dimension reduction.
Other techniques of machine learning (like classification
or clustering) are voluntary excluded to visualize IDS alerts,
because selecting and grouping alerts to create meaningful sets
and rules is the task of the front-line operators, given their
knowledge about the monitored network. Our approach gives
more flexibility to the operators. Moreover it makes sure to
bring back human intelligence in the loop and avoid grouping
unrelated alerts.
The variables contained in an alert consist of numerical val-
ues and categorical values [9]. Therefore, categorical variables
are transformed into numeric one, using the dummy variable
creation technique [7]. For each category, a new variable is
created, and elements belonging to this category take the value
1 for the new dummy variable, else 0. Thanks to this technique,
alerts are now only composed of numeric values, and can be
used as input for the principal component analysis.
B. Overview of the interface
Figure 1 shows the VEGAS interface presented to the
front-line operator. At the top, the header provides general
information and manipulations about the current situation. The
timegraph then provides the distribution of alerts over time. It
first gives knowledge to the operator about the variations in the
volume of alerts that could for instance indicate an increase
in the amount of attacks. The operator can also zoom in to
select a specific period of time.
Below, the scatterplot displays the result of the PCA that
was applied on the alerts. The Priority field of the alert is
shown on the scatterplot using colors to transmit this important
information to the front-line security operator.
Classification, Source IP, Destination IP, Source port and
Destination port bar charts present the distribution for these
features in the alerts that have been selected by the front-line
security operator in the scatterplot. Due to space constraint,
Figure 1 does not display all these bar charts.
At the bottom (still not shown on Figure 1), selected alerts
are listed in their raw form. This way, the operator can directly
view the subset of original matched alerts.
C. Analyzing alerts
The front-line operator can then select a group of alerts on
any charts. All other representations are automatically updated
to display only the values exhibited by the selected alerts.
He can go through the bar charts representing the values
exhibited by the alerts for each field to try to better understand
the features shared by the selected alerts. Bar charts have been
chosen because the are very efficient to represent categorical
fields when they can take numerous different values [10].
The front-line security operator can also filter the scale on
the values present for this field, meaning “the whole set of
values that are present in all alerts”, not only the selected
ones. This interaction helps the front-line operator in viewing
the values for the field in the selected alerts while keeping the
possibility to perceive the relative distribution of these values
compared to the full set of alerts.
D. Generating relevant filtering rules
While the set of alerts that leads to a rule has a set of
values for each of the fields, only some of these fields are
relevant. Therefore, the front-line security operator needs to
select the relevant fields to be included into the rule. Here, we
should emphasize that the selection of the relevant field could
arguably depend on the front-line security operator a priori
knowledge and/or way of understanding attacks. We advocate
that any experts should have the required knowledge.
Once a group of similar alerts has been identified and
the relevant fields selected, the front-line security operator
generates a new rule to be inserted in the dispatching filter.
The operator can then give a title to the new rule and add
comments to help analysts to better understand the identified
group of alerts.
The filtering rule generation is a simple automated process.
All the selected values of the selected fields for the selected
alerts are put in a dictionary. All the alerts matched by the filter
are immediately reclassified according to this new filtering
rule, including the alerts that were displayed as well as the
forthcoming alerts.
In our prototype, existing rules can not be directly modified
from the interface, but can be manually changed or updated
to remain relevant.
Figure 1. VEGAS interface for the front-line security operator (beginning).
III. CASE STUDY
We used the logs of the 2012 VAST Challenge [3] to
perform experiments with VEGAS, with more than 50,000
Snort alerts during the three days of capture. The first 4,500
alerts are used to initiate PCA computation. This corresponds
to the first hours of the challenge, from 6pm to 10pm. Figure 1
shows the representation generated by VEGAS. Three groups
of alerts clearly appear on the scatterplot. Due to the priority,
given by the color on the graph and knowing that a priority
of 1 is the most severe and 4 is the least severe, the group on
the bottom left is the first one to inspect.
By analyzing it using the interaction offered by VEGAS, we
are able to learn that this group is composed of 3,935 alerts,
and that it can actually be split in two distinct categories:
• The first, with only 60 alerts, appears only during the first
hour and is defined by a suspicious traffic toward the DNS
server on the port 53. Regarding their priority these alerts
should be analyzed more in depth by a security analyst
to see if this threat is as serious as it seems.
• The second category, with 3,510 alerts, is differentiated
from the first one by the destination port: 139 and
445. These two ports are used for Microsoft file sharing
technologies and are often targeted by attackers [5]. The
timegraph indicates that contrary to the traffic toward the
port 53, alerts of this type are still arriving at a huge rate.
These two different groups are visually close on the scatterplot
because all the source IP addresses are internal IP, meaning
that workstations have surely been compromised.
We now study the two other groups:
• The group of alerts at the top is composed of 32 alerts,
which arrived around 9pm. These alerts are characterized
by a single source IP address, 172.23.240.156, and
a single destination IP address, 172.23.0.1. Given the
number of different destination ports, and the repartition
of the alerts, we believe that a scan of the services on the
firewall is currently happening.
• The last group is a flow of alerts beginning at 7pm. We
have seven external IP communicating with many internal
IP using the port 6665. This is probably C&C connections
through IRC, to give orders to the compromised stations.
At this point, we create four rules, according to the four
groups we had discovered and the meaningful fields used to
describe them. This allows to quickly dispatch alerts to the
security analysts.
During the first iteration of the analysis, other alerts arrived
waiting to be displayed on VEGAS, so we refresh the interface
to display them. We perform a few iterations, each of them
using the alerts that have not otherwise been dispatched by the
already created filters. For instance, thanks to the scatterplot,
and the interaction proposed by VEGAS, we discovered that
two others external IP are creating suspicious IRC traffic.
We manually add them to the previous rule, updating the
knowledge of VEGAS.
IV. RELATED WORK
Aggregators and correlators have been proposed to auto-
matically aggregate and correlate alerts so as to reduce their
quantity and to improve their relevance. Nevertheless, they
often require extensive configuration and the quantity of alerts
that remains is still high and consequently very difficult to
handle, even by groups of security operators.
The security visualization community has proposed several
solutions to represent IDS alerts. SnortView [11] uses a two-
dimensions diagram to manage the flow of alerts created by
Snort. Alerts are displayed using the time each alert was raised
on the abscissa and the source IP on the ordinate. Different
colors and icons are used to represent alerts, according to
their classification (e.g. attacks on a mail server). However,
SnortView is limited to displaying a maximum of 40 different
alerts that happened over four hours. It is also limited since it
does not allow to add supplementary information to alerts.
In IDS Rainstorm [1], alerts are also displayed on a two-
dimensions diagram using time on the abscissa and destination
IP addresses on the ordinate. This representation allows to
identify the main targets and threats on the network. However,
the classification of the alert is not taken into account. And,
due to the time-sliding window, alerts can be missed.
TVi [2] applies PCA to detect anomalies in network flows.
The PCA algorithm is also used in [14]: the authors apply
this technique to detect runtime problem and classify errors.
Results from the PCA are automatically classified and decision
trees are created to visualize and understand what are the
characteristics of detected problems. However, both these tools
focus on detecting outliers. Therefore, they do not allow fine-
grained exploration of alerts as does VEGAS.
Regarding the visual exploration of alerts, VEGAS follows
an approach similar to CORGI [10], since the notion of values
of interest that helps keeping track of specific log entries can
be related to the notion of meaningful variable. Nevertheless,
CORGI was designed for in depth analysis of multiple data
sources while VEGAS is clearly intended for quick analysis
and sorting of alerts.
Finally, VEGAS follows the same objectives as the tool
proposed by Curtis et al. [4] that displays alerts in a list with a
specific color encoding for quick visual analysis. This proposal
provides basic sorting functions to be applied to variables, and
specific IP can be tagged as malicious for a later processing.
However, future alerts can not be automatically classified and
the list representation is not compatible with a high volume
of events.
V. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK
In this article, we presented VEGAS, an IDS alerts visual-
ization and classification tool that allows security operators to
manage important flows of IDS alerts on a network.
Experiments on the VAST Challenge 2012 dataset have pro-
duced encouraging results. We are now performing extended
tests on other datasets to really evaluate VEGAS. We are also
studying other projection techniques to compare the results
with those of the PCA.
Moreover, VEGAS can be improved in at least three ways.
First, performance could be boosted by replacing SVG-based
representation. Second, we believe that the time dimension is
currently underused. Time patterns between the different labels
of alerts may be found and this will lead to the description
of a global attack. Finally, VEGAS can be extended with
learning techniques. Filters are currently created as simple
patterns matching on data. Learning techniques could be used
to propose a broader definition for filters and attacks.
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